By ADEN KIPRUTO
National Intelligence Service (NIS) Director-General Noordin Haji played a central role in the diplomatic efforts that persuaded Sudan to reopen its market to Kenyan tea after a 20-month trade blockade that cost local exporters billions of shillings.
Behind the decision to lift the restrictions was an intense diplomatic campaign involving three high-level meetings between a Kenyan delegation led by Haji and Sudanese leaders, as Nairobi sought to repair relations with Khartoum following a bitter diplomatic fallout over Kenya’s alleged links with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
The engagements, held between September and October 2026, brought the Kenyan team face-to-face with a Sudanese delegation led by President of the Transitional Sovereignty Council and Commander-in-Chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.
Two of the meetings reportedly took place in Khartoum, while the third was held in an Arab country after the two sides agreed to move the discussions to a neutral venue to create a more favourable atmosphere for negotiations.
The discussions eventually yielded a breakthrough last week when Sudan announced the lifting of restrictions on Kenyan tea imports, bringing to an end a prolonged trade dispute that had disrupted one of Kenya’s important export markets.
Sudan’s Minister of Industry and Trade, Mahasin Ali Yaqoub, formalised the decision through Ministerial Order No. 25 of 2026, signed on November 8, allowing Kenyan tea imports to resume with immediate effect.
The order followed approval by Sudan’s Sovereignty Council on November 2 and a Cabinet communication issued on November 5.
The restrictions had been introduced on March 14, 2025, when Sudan suspended imports of Kenyan products through its ports, land borders and airports following tensions triggered by Nairobi’s hosting of RSF leaders.
Sources familiar with the negotiations say Haji and his team faced the difficult task of convincing the Sudanese leadership that Kenya’s engagement with the rebel movement did not amount to political or military support for the group fighting the Sudanese government.
Khartoum had accused Nairobi of providing the RSF with a platform to advance its political interests and pursue plans to establish a parallel administration in Sudan.
The dispute escalated in February 2025 after RSF commanders and their allies convened meetings in Nairobi, where they signed a political charter outlining their proposed alternative governing arrangement for Sudan.
The move angered Sudan’s military-led administration, which considered the meetings an affront to its sovereignty and an attempt to undermine the authority of the government in Khartoum.
Kenya, however, maintained that its engagement with different political and military actors in Sudan was consistent with its longstanding commitment to dialogue, mediation and peaceful conflict resolution.
During the negotiations, the Kenyan delegation reportedly insisted that Nairobi had not abandoned its policy of neutrality in regional conflicts.
“Kenya has always remained neutral in all conflicts and Sudan is no exception. We welcome everybody in Nairobi, including the Sudan government officials and RSF commanders,” Haji reportedly told the Sudanese government.
The delegation argued that allowing RSF commanders to visit Nairobi did not constitute recognition of their political or military ambitions, nor did it mean Kenya had withdrawn its support for Sudan’s recognised government.
Instead, the Kenyan team explained that Nairobi’s position was informed by the need to maintain diplomatic channels with all parties and encourage dialogue as a means of resolving the conflict.
Haji’s team also sought to reassure General al-Burhan that Kenya continued to recognise only one government in Sudan, under his leadership.
To reinforce that position, the delegation pointed to the continued presence of Sudan’s ambassador in Nairobi and Kenya’s decision to maintain its diplomatic representation in Khartoum despite the deteriorating relations.
The Kenyan team reportedly presented the retention of its ambassador in the Sudanese capital as evidence that Nairobi had neither withdrawn recognition of the government nor abandoned its diplomatic responsibilities towards the country.
But the diplomatic discussions were not limited to the political controversy surrounding the RSF.
Another sensitive issue that emerged during the meetings was Sudan’s allegation that Kenya had been supplying ammunition to the paramilitary group.
Khartoum had raised concerns over reports that ammunition bearing Kenyan markings had been found in areas under RSF control, placing Nairobi under pressure to explain the circumstances surrounding the alleged supplies.
The accusations were particularly delicate because they touched on Kenya’s military exports and its claim to neutrality in the Sudanese conflict.
The Kenyan delegation reportedly rejected suggestions that the government was deliberately arming the RSF, explaining that ammunition manufactured locally was sold through commercial arrangements to different countries.
The team pointed to the Eldoret-based Kenya Ordnance Factories Corporation (KOFC), which manufactures ammunition for export to various international markets.
“We only sell our bullets to countries and whatever those countries do with the ammunition is none of our business. We do not follow it up to determine what they do with them,” the Kenyan delegation reportedly told the Sudanese team.
The explanation was intended to distinguish legitimate commercial ammunition exports from claims that the Kenyan government was directly supplying weapons to one of the warring parties.
Nevertheless, the reported presence of ammunition bearing Kenyan markings in RSF-controlled territories has continued to raise questions about the final destinations of military exports and the effectiveness of controls governing international arms transfers.
The issue added another layer of complexity to negotiations that were already dealing with questions of diplomatic recognition, regional security and the political future of Sudan.
For Kenya, however, the stakes went beyond the diplomatic disagreement, with the restrictions having inflicted considerable damage on the country’s tea export business.
Before the ban, Sudan was among Kenya’s significant tea markets, importing approximately 35 million kilogrammes annually, valued at about $70 million, equivalent to approximately Sh9 billion.
The suspension disrupted established trading arrangements between Kenyan exporters and Sudanese buyers, leaving large consignments stranded at the Port of Mombasa and disrupting shipments destined for the Sudanese market.
At the time the restrictions were imposed, approximately 207 forty-foot containers of Kenyan tea were reportedly stranded at the port, while consignments valued at more than $24 million were either awaiting shipment or already in transit.
The situation particularly affected exporters who had blended, packaged and branded their products specifically for Sudanese consumers, making it difficult to redirect the tea to alternative markets without incurring additional costs.
The financial burden persisted throughout the period of the restrictions.
By August 2026, more than 3.44 million kilogrammes of Kenyan tea valued at over $10.3 million remained in warehouses in Mombasa, according to industry figures reported by The EastAfrican.
The restrictions also affected particular tea grades traditionally favoured by Sudanese consumers, leaving traders with stocks that were not easily transferable to other markets.
Smallholder farmers were equally concerned about the wider implications of the dispute, particularly the possibility of reduced demand, lower export earnings and disruptions across the tea value chain.
The reopening of the Sudanese market is therefore expected to provide much-needed relief to exporters, allowing them to resume business with their previous customers and work towards recovering lost ground.
Although Haji’s diplomatic engagements were instrumental in addressing the concerns raised by Khartoum, the breakthrough also followed renewed high-level political engagement between President William Ruto and Sudanese Prime Minister Kamil Idris.
Ruto welcomed Sudan’s decision to lift the restrictions, describing it as an important development for Kenyan exporters, farmers and the country’s wider agricultural sector.
Public accounts of the breakthrough have highlighted discussions between Ruto and Idris on the sidelines of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Heads of State and Government Summit held in Harare, Zimbabwe, in October.
The President said the engagement helped secure the reopening of the Sudanese market, demonstrating the importance of direct diplomatic intervention in resolving disputes affecting trade and economic cooperation.
The subsequent signing of Ministerial Order No. 25 of 2026 on November 8 provided the formal legal basis for resuming Kenyan tea imports.
The order directs the relevant Sudanese authorities to implement the decision, effectively ending the restrictions that had locked Kenyan exporters out of the market for nearly two years.
For Nairobi, the development represents an important diplomatic and commercial achievement at a time when the government is seeking to expand agricultural exports, strengthen regional trade and protect markets for locally produced goods.
For Khartoum, reopening trade with Kenya offers an opportunity to restore economic relations with an important regional partner despite the continuing instability caused by the country’s internal conflict.
Sudan has been embroiled in a devastating civil war since April 2023, when fighting erupted between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF.
The conflict has resulted in widespread displacement, destruction of infrastructure and a severe humanitarian crisis, with millions of people affected by the fighting.
General al-Burhan leads the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Transitional Sovereignty Council, while Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, popularly known as Hemedti, commands the RSF.
The war has complicated relations between several African countries, with competing diplomatic interests and allegations of external support for the rival factions creating tensions across the region.
Kenya’s decision to maintain engagement with both sides has consequently placed Nairobi in a delicate diplomatic position as it seeks to promote peace while safeguarding its international relationships and economic interests.
The lifting of the tea restrictions could now provide an opening for a broader restoration of relations between Kenya and Sudan.
However, sustaining the latest diplomatic gains will depend on whether the two governments can maintain the goodwill generated by the negotiations and address other outstanding concerns.
For Kenya’s tea industry, the immediate challenge will be to restore commercial links with Sudanese buyers, clear accumulated stocks and rebuild a market that previously generated billions of shillings in annual export earnings.
After 20 months of uncertainty, the reopening of Sudan offers Kenyan tea traders an opportunity to recover lost business, while the diplomatic breakthrough provides Nairobi and Khartoum with a chance to turn a bitter political dispute into renewed economic cooperation.
